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Harnessing quantum processes is an efficient method to generate truly indeterministic random
numbers, which are of fundamental importance for cryptographic protocols, security applications
or Monte-Carlo simulations. Recently, quantum random number generators based on continuous
variables have gathered a lot of attention due to the potentially high bit rates they can deliver.
Especially quadrature measurements on shot-noise limited states have been studied in detail as
they do not offer any side information to potential adversaries under ideal experimental conditions.
However, they may be subject to additional classical noise beyond the quantum limit, which may
become a source of side information for eavesdroppers. While such eavesdropping attacks have been
investigated in theory in some detail, experimental studies are still rare. We experimentally realize
a continuous variable eavesdropping attack, based on heterodyne detection, on a trusted quantum
random number generator and discuss the limitations for secure random number generation that
arise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is a fundamental resource for many
technological applications ranging from cryptography
[1] and computer simulations [2] up to gaming. For
those purposes which only require uniformly distributed
numbers and do not focus on security and full un-
predictability, deterministic approaches may be used.
This includes pseudorandom number generators that
generate a deterministic sequence of random numbers
based on a seed or classical random number generators
that exploit resources such as classical noise to create
random numbers that are in principle deterministic, but
in practice hard to predict [3, 4]. However, it is not
possible to strictly validate the unpredictability of such
random numbers. Accordingly, if security is the highest
priority, quantum random number generators (QRNGs)
based on inherently unpredictable quantum processes
are considered as the best choice for random number
generation [5]. Plenty of physical realizations of QRNGs
have been demonstrated based on effects ranging from
phase fluctuations [6] and photon arrival times [7–9] over
polarization fluctuations [10], which-way information
at beams splitters [11, 12] and spontaneous emission
noise [13, 14] up to photon number noise detection using
mobile phone cameras [15].
While most of these implementations rely on discrete
variables, recently also realizations based on continuous
variables such as the quadratures of the light field form
an attractive alternative as they commonly offer fast
random number generation rates [16] and several bits
of entropy per measurement [17]. Determining the
exact amount of random bits that can be extracted
from a single measurement is a nontrivial task for any
random number generator as it depends on the amount
∗ marc.assmann@tu-dortmund.de
of quantum side information that may be available to
potential eavesdroppers. Accordingly, the extractable
randomness depends on the implementation of the
QRNG, the application and on whether several parts
of the QRNG, such as the source or the detector can
be considered as trusted. In general, several groups of
QRNGs can be identified [18]. Most practical QRNGs,
including most of those available commercially belong
to the category of trusted QRNGs. These are known
to deliver secure true random numbers if the physical
implementation of the device is faithful to the model
assumed. However, if these assumptions are not fulfilled,
for example in the case of a malicious manufacturer
manipulating either the source or the readout device,
the output may seem to be genuinely random to the
user, although it is in fact known to some adversary, so
the random numbers may not be private. A precreated
string of random numbers copied to the device by some
adversary is a prime example for such a scenario. In
this case, there is no way to certify whether a minimal
amount of genuine randomness is present or not. Still,
such designs show enduring popularity due to relatively
low cost and ease of implementation as well as high bit
rates.
On the other hand, device-independent implementations
of QRNGs based on entanglement can be built, which
are in fact self-testing and indeed deliver private ran-
dom numbers [19, 20], so that a verifiable amount of
randomness can be extracted without a need to trust
the implementation. However, these device-independent
protocols require non-locality, which results in complex
setups and rather low bit rates up to about 200 bits per
second [21].
Semi-device-independent QRNGs are an attempt
to merge the advantages of both classes of QRNGs.
They still provide high bit rates up to several gigabit
per second [16] and offer a certain certifiable amount
of randomness, but require weaker assumptions with
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2respect to the faithfulness of the QRNG. Possible
protocols include QRNGs with a trusted readout
section, but an untrusted source [22], the opposite
case [23], assumptions on the overlap of states in phase
space [24] or the size of the underlying Hilbert space [25].
In the cases of fully trusted and device-independent
QRNGs, it is possible to determine the actual amount
of randomness per measurement delivered by the de-
vice because the available quantum side information is
well defined either by the definition of the protocol or
the self-testing process. Here, theoretical lower bounds
for the extractable randomness are well established. On
the contrary, for semi-device-independent realizations of
QRNGs, the exact amount of quantum side information
available to potential eavesdroppers depends strongly on
the actual protocol and assumptions used and is not nec-
essarily easy to determine theoretically. Here, experi-
mental studies of actual eavesdropping attacks may prove
very helpful to adequately quantify the quantum side in-
formation present, but are not necessarily easy to con-
duct [26–29]. In the following, we present the experi-
mental realization of such an eavesdropping attack on a
trusted continuous variable QRNG based on homodyne
detection of thermal light [30]. In a fully trusted scenario,
where the attacker has no access to the source and the
light fields, these QRNGs are known to offer a significant
enhancement of the extractable randomness compared
to QRNGs based on homodyne detection of the vacuum
state. We find that in a scenario of reduced trust, where
the state of the light field is still assured to be thermal,
but an adversary may gain access to the light field us-
ing beam splitters, an eavesdropping attack on such a
trusted device may reduce the extractable randomness
from a thermal state down to the amount that may be
extracted from a vacuum state.
II. THE CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QRNG
We investigate a continuous variable QRNG. The
QRNG user (Alice) mixes a light field of interest
with a strong single mode local oscillator (LO) on a
beam splitter and guides it to a homodyne detector,
which performs differential photodetection and yields
a voltage signal proportional to one quadrature of the
electromagnetic field [31, 32]. The measured quadrature
X˜ is then equivalent to a random value drawn from a
probability distribution given by the integral projection
WX˜ of the Wigner function of the light field along a
direction determined by the relative phase ϕ between
the signal and Alice’s local oscillator. As the relative
phase between the LO and the signal is not fixed, we
define the quadrature measured by Alice as X˜ and the
orthogonal quadrature which is unknown to Alice as P˜ .
The measured voltage signal is then digitized using an
analog-to-digital converter and effectively sorted into
bins of finite width. Subsequently, the index of these
bins acts as the random number. In the following, we
will denote the binned quadratures as X and P . Such
QRNGs have already been realized using the vacuum
[33] or thermal light [30] as input states. The random
numbers determined this way are usually not distributed
uniformly, so it is possible to perform additional ran-
domness extraction [34] to create a compressed shorter
string composed of independent identically distributed
random numbers.
Here, we implement a continuous variable eavesdrop-
ping attack by adding a half-wave plate and a polarizing
beam splitter to redirect some of the signal towards a
second detection channel, where a malicious eavesdrop-
per (Eve) placed two additional homodyne detectors and
performs heterodyne detection, which allows her to deter-
mine the Husimi Q-function of the redirected light field.
To this end, Eve uses local oscillator beams with orthog-
onal phase, which are derived from Alice’s local oscillator
beam and thus share a fixed phase relationship with it.
The result of this measurement provides Eve with some
side information ε about the random number generated
by Alice. The full setup is depicted in figure 1 and im-
plemented as follows:
We use a pulsed Ti:sapphire laser delivering pulses with
a duration of about 120 fs at a repetition rate of about
75.4 MHz as the local oscillator and a Toptica DL pro
continuous wave diode laser operated far below thresh-
old as the thermal light source for the QRNG. The latter
has no fixed phase relative to the local oscillator. Both
are set to a central wavelength of 830 nm. The homo-
dyne detectors were provided by Femto (model HCA-S),
are identical to the ones used in [35] and feature a band-
width of 100 MHz and a transimpedance gain of 5 kV/A.
The signals from each detector were filtered using band-
stop filters at 75.4 and 150.8 MHz and a low-pass filter at
100 MHz to remove all harmonics of the laser repetition
rate. Afterwards the signals were amplified by a factor
of 5 using a 300 MHz SR455 Voltage amplifier from Stan-
ford Research Systems and digitized using an 8-bit 5 Gs/s
analog-to-digital converter M4i.2234-x8 from spectrum,
which provides a sampling rate of 1.25 Gs/s per detection
channel. It is important to note that the multi-channel
detection setup does not only measure a histogram of
quadratures, but records every single detected quadra-
ture with a timestamp, which allows us to determine the
additional amount of information gained by Eve a pos-
teriori. The detector is shot noise-limited for LO powers
above 1 mW and yields a common-mode rejection ratio
of 68.9 dB and a low-frequency shot-noise clearance of
about 12.5 dB for the LO powers used here. For calibra-
tion purposes, we perform a test measurement using only
the LO in the absence of any signal, which corresponds
to a measurement of the vacuum state. As the quadra-
ture variance of the vacuum state is known, this pro-
cedure yields a conversion factor between the measured
voltages and the quadratures of the light field. The elec-
tronic noise present broadens the vacuum state variance
3by about 3%. As this is small compared to our chosen
quadrature bin width, we will neglect this effect. Also,
we would like to point out that each individual recorded
voltage is digitized with 8-bit resolution, but the signal of
interest is the total voltage time-integrated over a whole
local oscillator pulse, which may effectively result in a
higher resolution. Still, we chose to discretize all the
quadratures used in this manuscript with 8 bit resolu-
tion, corresponding to a bin width of 0.15625 for X and
P . An additional advantage of using a pulsed LO lies in
the high temporal resolution it allows us to achieve. As
the instantaneous amplitude and phase of the thermal
light field will typically change randomly on a timescale
given by the sub-ps coherence time of the light field, us-
ing a short pulsed LO ensures that we do not average
the signal over several coherence times. Throughout this
manuscript, we assume that Eve has full access to the
calibration procedures of all detectors. Therefore, our
attack targets both the detectors and the light fields in-
volved. Also, due to the high laser repetition rates we use,
we can already perform millions of experimental runs in
a few tens of milliseconds. On this timescale, mechanical
drifts of the relative phase of the different LOs derived
from the same laser are not very significant, so we do not
perform any active phase stabilization. As we assume
that Eve has access to the calibration procedures, this
is sufficient information for her to align her LOs phases
with respect to the settings chosen by Alice. For a real
long-term eavesdropping attack, Eve would have to com-
pensate long term phase drifts or timing errors as well.
If the timing used by Eve is off by more than approxi-
mately one coherence time of the signal with respect to
the timing chosen by Alice, the side information available
to Eve will be reduced significantly.
III. QUANTUM SIDE INFORMATION
In this section, we will discuss the amount of ran-
domness present and several measures that quantify it
both for the fully trusted QRNG scenario and for a
semi-device-independent case, where the source itself is
trusted, but an eavesdropping attack on the signal is pos-
sible in the readout section. First, we will introduce the
trusted QRNG case and then discuss how quantum side
information reduces the extractable randomness. To this
end, we will discuss two different measures for the ex-
tractable randomness. First, we will discuss the min-
entropy, which is the relevant figure of merit for deter-
mining the secure generation rate of a QRNG in the case
of an attack. Second, we will discuss the expected guess-
work, which is the quantity of interest in the case of a
brute force attack, where Eve is allowed to make several
guesses. It is not relevant for the security of QRNGs, but
useful for other fields, such as quantum state estimation.
A. Min-entropy
In order to evaluate the effective number of random
bits Alice can extract per measurement, she needs to
evaluate the amount of knowledge about her measure-
ment result available to Eve, which defines the remaining
amount of true randomness left. In the case of a trusted
QRNG, the amount of true randomness is directly linked
to the min-entropy of X given by:
Hmin(X) = − log2
(
max(WX)
)
, (1)
where WX corresponds to the binned Wigner function
using the bin size chosen for X and P . The min-entropy
yields the effective number of random bits per measure-
ment and is equivalent to assuming that Eve makes a sin-
gle guess on the outcome of the measurement and chooses
the bin with highest probability. Thus, the min-entropy
defines a solid lower bound for the number of extractable
random bits βs that is also easy to treat theoretically.
For a fixed experimental resolution it depends only on
the largest value of the probability distribution, but not
on its precise shape.
In the presence of quantum side information ε avail-
able to Eve, evaluating the extractable randomness be-
comes more sophisticated. The Leftover Hash Lemma
[38] states that in the presence of quantum side informa-
tion, the amount of extractable randomness is given by
the quantum conditional min-entropy [39]
Hmin(X|ε) = − log2
(
max(WX,c)
)
, (2)
where WX,c denotes the integral projection of the con-
ditional Wigner function at Alice’s detector depending
on the quantum side information available to Eve. As
max(WX,c) > max(WX), the effective number of random
bits per measurement decreases correspondingly.
B. Expected Guesswork
The min-entropy focuses on the probability of Eve
guessing the correct experimental outcome on her first
try. In contrast, one may also assume a brute force at-
tack on the random number generator, where Eve is al-
lowed to make several consecutive guesses. This scenario
is obviously not relevant with respect to the security of
QRNGs as no realistic protocol will allow for brute force
attacks, but it is of interest for applications such as quan-
tum state tomography of time-varying fields, where an
experimenter may for example be interested in identi-
fying the state of a light field that changes slowly with
time through repeated measurements. Here, one is rather
interested in finding the value that has the highest likeli-
hood of being in accordance with all experimental results.
Accordingly, it is mandatory to consider also the possi-
ble experimental outcomes beyond the one with highest
probability in order to determine the leftover randomness
or uncertainty in such a scenario.
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for the eavesdropping attack. Alice receives the light field of interest, superposes it with a
strong pulsed local oscillator at a certain time determined by the position of a delay line and performs homodyne detection
using balanced detector BD1. Every detected quadrature is a random number occuring with relative frequencies given by the
projection WX of the Wigner function of Alice’s signal along one axis chosen by the position of the phase shifting piezo element
Pz1. Eve redirects an adjustable fraction of the signal and also a part of the local oscillator to her part of the setup and
performs heterodyne detection. The settings of both the delay line and Pz1 are known to Eve, so she samples the same section
of the signal Alice does and she identifies the relative phase of her local oscillator beams compared to Alice’s local oscillator.
Depending on the pair of quadratures measured, Eve then constructs the conditional Husimi function for the signal seen by
Alice, reconstructs the conditional Wigner function Wc for this signal and determines its projection WX,c along the axis used
by Alice. An exemplary set of experimental data is shown in the right panels. The upper panel shows the Husimi function
in Eve’s channel for nEve = 7.09. The small red ring denotes a measured quadrature set of XE = 3, PE = 0, which results in
the WX,c denoted by the red line in the lower panel for nAlice = 2.28 and PZ1 set such that Alice measures the X quadrature.
WX,c yields a significantly narrower probability distribution compared to WX given by the black line, indicating the additional
side information gathered by Eve.
In the case that Eve is allowed to make several guesses
and perform a brute force attack, it is harder to quan-
tify the precise amount of randomness present adequately
as the whole probability distribution needs to be taken
into account. A reasonable quantity to characterize the
amount of randomness present in such a scenario is the
expected guesswork
〈G(X)〉 =
∑
x
G(x)p(X = x), (3)
which corresponds to the average number of guesses Eve
needs to make to find the correct result. Here, G(x) rep-
resents the number of guesses required to find the correct
result X in the case that X = x. The expected guesswork
depends strongly on the strategy used by Eve. Assum-
ing that there are n different possible outcomes, Eve may
apply an optimized attack pattern, where she orders her
guesses from highest to lowest probability of success, so
that G(xmax) = 1 and G(xmin) = n, where xmax and
xmin denote the outcomes with highest and lowest prob-
ability, respectively. Naively, one might expect that this
number is related to the Shannon entropy of X and it is
well known that a lower bound for 〈G(X)〉 exists, which
is directly related to Shannon entropy. However, this
bound is not tight, there is no nontrivial upper bound
and in most cases 〈G(X)〉 bears little relation to it [36].
5Instead, it has been pointed out [37] that for a series of
k measurements with outcomes that Eve tries to guess,
the asymptotic moments of the expected guesswork for
guessing all of the outcomes correctly simultaneously are
directly related to the specific Re´nyi entropy of X as fol-
lows:
lim
k→∞
1
k
log2〈G(Xk)α〉 = (1 + α) log2
∑
x
p(X = x)
1
1+α .
(4)
However, this quantity is meaningful only for large k. For
estimating how prone to a brute force attack a QRNG
is, 〈G(X)〉 itself is indeed a more suitable indicator in
most cases. For independent identically distributed ran-
dom numbers consisting of β random bits, a brute force
attacker attempting to guess the random number will re-
quire on average a number of guesses given by:
〈G(X)iid〉 = 2β−1 + 0.5. (5)
As the random number distribution in our scenario fol-
lows the Gaussian distribution of quadratures, it is not
uniform prior to randomness extraction. Eve may there-
fore perform a modified optimal brute force attack based
on educated guesses and it is expected that 〈G(X)〉 ≤
〈G(X)iid〉.
In the presence of side information, also the expected
guesswork must be replaced by the conditional expected
guesswork:
〈G(X|ε)〉 =
∑
x
Gε(x)p(X = x|ε), (6)
where Eve reorders her guesses according to the side in-
formation available.
IV. THE EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
We first discuss how Eve gains access to ε. At the beam
splitter that Eve uses for the attack, the thermal signal
field Xth, Pth enters at one input port and a vacuum state
Xvac, Pvac enters at the other. Both become mixed and
the total output may be described by a joint Husimi-Q
function, which depends on the following effective mixed
quadratures, where XA, PA and XE , PE describe the val-
ues for Alice’s and Eve’s part of the setup, respectively:
Xth =rXA − tXE (7)
Pth =rPA − tPE
Xvac =tXA + rXE
Pvac =tPA + rPE .
Here, r and t denote the reflection and transmission coef-
ficients of the beam splitter. In these variables, the joint
Husimi-Q function is given by:
Hj(X1, P1, X2, P2) =
H4res
4pi2(n+ 1)
exp (−1
2
X2th + P
2
th
n+ 1
)
(8)
× exp (−1
2
(X2vac + P
2
vac)),
where n is the total signal photon number and Hres
represents the effective resolution due to the quadrature
bin size. As Eve has access to the signal photon number,
for every single pair of quadratures XE ,PE she measures,
she may insert these values into Eq.(7) and (8). This
reduces the joint Husimi-Q function Hj to a conditional
Husimi-Q function Hc for the expected outcome at
Alice’s part of the setup for every measurement Eve
performs. For signal light fields that are not minimum-
uncertainty states, Hc will be a narrower distribution
than the Husimi-Q function of the bare signal state, so
Eve has gained some quantum side information about
the instantaneous state of the light field. In order to
predict the value Alice will measure, Eve now needs
to convert this conditional Husimi-Q function into a
conditional Wigner function Wc. As Hc essentially is
the convolution of Wc with a Gaussian corresponding to
the vacuum state, this requires a deconvolution which
can be cumbersome in general. However, in our scenario
the range of possible states of the signal light field is
limited to well-behaved classical light fields, which are
Gaussian states themselves. In this case, Eve can simply
construct Wc from Hc using Gaussian deconvolution,
which corresponds to constructing a Gaussian with
the same mean quadrature values 〈X〉 and 〈P 〉, but
standard deviations σX and σP reduced by 0.5. We
assume that Eve also has access to the settings of the
phase shifting element used by Alice, so she can also
perform a projection of the determined conditional
Wigner function along the axis chosen by Alice. Eve
may then sort the possible random number bins from
highest to lowest probability and begin guessing.
After repeating this experiment 2 million times, we
keep track of each individual result measured by Alice
and the number of guesses Eve needed to make to guess
the correct value measured by Alice in each experimental
run. The average number of guesses Eve needed to make
now directly provides an experimentally determined
value the expected guesswork and the relative frequency
of Eve being correct on the first guess allows one to de-
termine Hmin by inserting this relative frequency instead
of max(WX) and max(WX,c) in equations (1) and (2),
respectively. Comparing both quantities for the condi-
tional case in the presence of quantum side information
and the unconditional case provides information about
how successful the eavesdropping attack actually is. We
would further like to point out that this experimentally
determined value automatically includes influences such
as electronic noise, and potential mismatch of the chosen
discretization values or calibration procedures.
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FIG. 2. Min-entropy for the QRNG using a thermal state for
different photon number ratios between the channels of Eve
and Alice. Red (upper) dots represent the experimentally de-
termined min-entropy for the bare thermal state, while black
(lower) dots correspond to the reduced min-entropy in the
presence of side information. Crosses give the values expected
according to theory. The dashed blue line shows the expected
number of guesses for a vacuum state for comparison.
V. QRNG SECURITY
We have realized this eavesdropping attack experi-
mentally for several different distributions of the total
signal photon number n between the photon numbers
nAlice and nEve that reach the QRNG detection channel
and the eavesdropping channel, respectively. In a real
eavesdropping attempt, Eve would take care to keep
nAlice constant to ensure that the attack is not noticed,
e.g. by permanently adding a tunable attenuator in the
signal beam. Instead, we deliberately choose several
splitting ratios between nAlice and nEve to investigate
the physics behind the attack, whereby we increase
nEve while decreasing nAlice. A list of the splitting
ratios used is given in table II in the appendix. The
results for the experimentally determined estimates for
the min-entropy as given by the peak probability of
the projected conditional Wigner function are shown in
figure 2. The experimental results match the theoretical
predictions well. Here, red dots denote the min-entropy
determined for the bare thermal signal state without
taking additional side information into account. As
expected, the min-entropy increases with the photon
number received by Alice. The Wigner function of a
thermal state is a Gaussian centered at 0 in phase space
that gets broader with increasing photon number. Ac-
cordingly the probability of detecting large quadrature
values increases as well, while the peak probability goes
down, which is known to enhance Hmin(X) [30]. For
low photon numbers, Hmin(X) approaches the value of
3.51, which is the min-entropy that would be achieved
for the vacuum state for the quadrature resolution given
by the experimental setup. One may now compare
these values to the results for Hmin(X|ε). In all cases,
the conditional min-entropy when taking the side
information into account is reduced compared to the
bare signal state, but the magnitude of this reduction
varies. For intermediate splitting ratios close to one, the
reduction amounts to approximately one bit, while both
for very small and very large photon numbers in Eve’s
detection channel the reduction becomes significantly
smaller. This is obvious for small values of nEve. In
this case, the state of the light field in Eve’s part of the
setup is close to the vacuum state. Due to the classical
correlations between the light fields received by Eve
and Alice, Eve will essentially find a light field that is
proportional to the one in Alice’s part of the setup, but
scaled according to the relative photon numbers and
with an additional vacuum contribution, which enters at
the beam splitter. For small nEve the latter contribution,
which is uncorrelated to the signal light field, dominates
and Eve gains little side information. This effect is
less obvious for large nEve. Here, it is important to
stress that in order to be able to cover a wide range of
relative photon numbers, none of the photon numbers
was kept constant and for all relative photon numbers,
where nEve is large, nAlice is small. Therefore, in these
cases the light field received by Alice is close to the
vacuum state. As the vacuum state min-entropy forms a
lower bound of the min-entropy for Gaussian states, its
possible reduction in the presence of side information is
also limited.
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the inter-
play between nEve and the amount of side information
gained, we simulated eavesdropping attacks for a fixed
photon number nAlice = 5 received by Alice and different
splitting ratios. The results are shown in figure 3. In the
limit of nEve → 0, eavesdropping becomes inefficient and
the conditional min-entropy matches the unconditional
min-entropy of the bare thermal state, while for large
values of nEve, Hmin(X|ε) approaches the value expected
for the vacuum state. For intermediate relative photon
numbers, a smooth sigmoid-like transition between both
extremes takes place. This effect can be explained
intuitively. After the initial signal passes the beam
splitter, both Alice and Eve receive scaled versions of
this original signal with added noise due to additional
vacuum contributions. When Eve measures a pair of
quadratures, this allows her to map her result to a
phase space region describing the state of the light field
in Alice’s part of the setup. The width of this region
determines the amount of side information available to
Eve and depends on two factors. First, it is broadened
by the vacuum contributions and second, due to the
differing photon numbers in the two arms of the setup,
the quasiprobability distribution for the arm receiving
the larger photon number is spread out further in phase
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FIG. 3. Conditional min-entropy for a fixed photon number
nAlice = 5 received by Alice. With increasing redirected pho-
ton number nEve, the conditional min-entropy reduces from
a value corresponding to the bare thermal state to the min-
entropy of a vacuum state.
space as compared to the other arm. Considering first
the pure signal and neglecting the additional vacuum
contributions, Eve can map a finite region in phase space
given by her experimental resolution to a smaller region
in Alice’s phase space, if she receives more photons than
Alice and she can map this phase space region to a
larger region in Alice’s phase space, if she receives fewer
photons than Alice. The former case yields more side
information. In the extreme case of receiving orders of
magnitude more photons than Alice, Eve can map her
phase space region containing the measured quadrature
to a single point in Alice’s phase space. In this case,
the only uncertainty about the quadrature measured by
Alice arises due to the additional vacuum contributions
which are not correlated to the signal and therefore set
the lower bound for the conditional min-entropy Eve
may reach to that of a vacuum state.
VI. BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS
So far, we have considered only the min-entropy for
a given quadrature distribution, which depends solely
on the largest probability that may occur. This ren-
ders it easy to determine, but it yields only limited
amounts of information. Various distributions with the
same peak probability, but widely varying variances will
yield the same min-entropy. However, for optimal brute
force attacks the expected guesswork for such distribu-
tions that share the same min-entropy may differ sig-
nificantly. Therefore, we also determined the conditional
and unconditional expected guesswork for the eavesdrop-
ping attack. Results are shown in figure 4. The expected
guesswork is clearly reduced significantly in the presence
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FIG. 4. Expected guesswork for the QRNG using a thermal
state for different photon number ratios between the chan-
nels of Eve and Alice. Red dots represent the experimentally
determined guesswork for the bare thermal state, while black
dots correspond to the reduced mean number of guesses in the
presence of side information. Crosses give the values expected
according to theory. The dashed blue line shows the expected
number of guesses for a vacuum state for comparison. Open
symbols denote the worst-case expected guessworks for a se-
quence of random bits with a length given by the min-entropy
of the QRNG, which are too pessimistic.
of side information. This reduction may amount to val-
ues as large as 50% for photon number ratios nEve/nAlice
close to and slightly below 1. A lower border is given by
the value of 7.82 that corresponds to the expected guess-
work for a vacuum state. This value is approximately
reached for small values of nAlice and it should be empha-
sized that there is no possibility to surpass this value us-
ing the suggested eavesdropping attack. This also means
that applying an eavesdropping attack of the type pre-
sented here to a vacuum state cannot yield any additional
quantum side information, which is an expected result.
Overall, the change of the expected guesswork in the
presence of side information bears some resemblance to
the corresponding change in min-entropy. In order to
emphasize the additional value of investigating the ex-
pected guesswork, we also compare the average number
of guesses required in our experiment to the worst-case
prediction given by naively inserting the min-entropy for
β in eq. (5). These worst-case estimates are shown as
open symbols both in the presence and absence of side in-
formation. These values are always lower than the mean
number of guesses actually required in the experiment,
which shows that the estimate for the extractable ran-
domness given by the min-entropy is pessimistic for the
brute-force attack scenario. One might also find it sur-
prising that this number may actually drop below the
expected guesswork for a vacuum state. While at first
look, this result might seem to contradict the fact that
one cannot reduce the min-entropy of an ideal vacuum
state by gathering side information, it rather empha-
8sizes that the min-entropy and the expected guesswork
describe different physical aspects and processes. Min-
entropy gives a correct worst-case estimate for Eve per-
forming the correct guess on the first try. However, the
worst-case scenario required for eq. (5) is different. For
a binned probability distribution of known peak proba-
bility pmax, the expected number of guesses is minimized
if all bins that occur with a finite probability occur with
probability pmax, while all other bins do not occur at
all. However, for high enough resolution, such a state is
not necessarily among the physically allowed states as its
variance will be smaller than the variance of the vacuum
state. Such narrow distributions may still be feasible for
QRNGs based on homodyning by extending the range
of possible states to squeezed states, which indeed may
show a smaller variance for one quadrature. However, for
QRNGs based on heterodyning [16] this is not possible
and the min-entropy indeed cannot be related to the ex-
pected guesswork anymore. Accordingly, we would like to
emphasize that indeed the expected guesswork considers
a different kind of attack than min-entropy and therefore
complements it and is worthwhile to investigate as an ex-
perimental figure of merit.
Finally, we also demonstrate that the biased random
numbers we receive from our QRNG can be turned into
true random numbers. To this end, we perform two-
universal hashing on a set of random numbers [40], which
turns 8-bit strings of biased random numbers into 4-bit
strings of true random numbers and merges two consec-
utive numbers into a single 8-bit string of true random
numbers. In order to test whether these random num-
bers are really independent and distributed identically,
we again investigate the expected guesswork required by
Eve to identify the random numbers. As can be seen
directly from eq.(5), the expected number of guesses for
true 8-bit random numbers amounts to 128.5. We now
determine the expected guesswork for Eve adapting two
different strategies. First, 〈G(X)〉ind represents the num-
ber of guesses she needs to make when trying to guess the
combination of both individual biased random numbers.
To this end, Eve uses her side information gained via the
eavesdropping attack and sorts all possible combinations
of biased random numbers such that her first guess is the
combination with the highest combined probability and
sorts all combinations in order of decreasing probability.
〈G(X)〉merged instead represents a standard brute force
attack, where Eve directly tries to guess the merged 8-
bit random number and simply starts from bin 1 and just
picks the bins in ascending order. The results are shown
in figure 5. 〈G(X)〉merged always yields values close to
the expected 〈G(X)〉iid = 128.5 guesses, which does not
certify true randomness, but at least shows that trivial
correlations are absent in the data. More interestingly,
in most cases 〈G(X)〉ind is significantly enhanced up to
values of 1800 guesses compared to the value expected for
true random numbers. This shows that although Eve has
access to some side information about the biased random
numbers, this is not enough to also yield side informa-
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FIG. 5. Expected guesswork for random numbers after
performing randomness extraction and merging two consec-
utively measured biased random numbers into an 8-bit true
random number. 〈G(X)〉ind represents the mean number of
guesses required when Eve tries to guess both biased ran-
dom numbers simultaneously, while 〈G(X)〉merged is the mean
number of guesses needed to guess the true random number
using a brute force approach. For comparison, the expected
guesswork required for a true 8-bit random number is indi-
cated by a dashed blue line.
tion about the merged random numbers after perform-
ing randomness extraction. Only for the largest ratio
of nEve/nAlice, the mean number of guesses required by
Eve is slightly below 〈G(X)〉iid with 93.2 guesses. This
is remarkable because judging from Hmin(X|ε) alone, the
extractable randomness per measurement took values be-
low 4 bits per measurement already starting from ratios
of nEve/nAlice ≥ 2. It is therefore not trivial that per-
forming randomness extraction for this range of values
results in an expected guesswork that would still be in
line with true 8-bit random numbers.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have experimentally investigated a trusted QRNG
based on homodyning a thermal light field subject to a
heterodyne eavesdropping attack. The presence of side
information reduces both the min-entropy and the ex-
pected guesswork towards the values that may be ob-
tained by using a vacuum state instead of a thermal light
field. This result has immediate implications for QRNGs
based on continuous variables. QRNGs based on ther-
mal light have been shown to offer enhanced min-entropy
compared to QRNGs sampling vacuum, when using the
same experimental resolution [30], but they either need
to be operated as trusted QRNGs or used in applications
where security of the random numbers is not relevant.
Otherwise, eavesdropping attacks may reduce the per-
formance of the thermal light QRNG such, that it does
9not offer any advantages compared to sampling vacuum.
At this point, it is worthwhile to emphasize again the
assumptions that our experimental study is based on.
First, the lower bounds derived rely on the assumption
that the QRNG is trusted in the sense that the prepared
signal state indeed is a thermal state, uncorrelated with
respect to the eavesdropper. A malicious QRNG manu-
facturer might as well prepare a two-mode squeezed vac-
uum state, which will also look thermal to Alice and
would result in lower min-entropy [33] or single-mode
squeezed light. It should be noted that a QRNG based on
heterodyning instead of homodyning would be less sus-
ceptible to such attacks. Also, the manufacturer might
mimic the thermal state by preparing coherent states of
different amplitude and phase, which would also directly
yield side information, which reduces the min-entropy of
the signal to the min-entropy of a vacuum state. Along
the same lines, the deconvolution procedure used by Eve
to calculate the conditional Wigner function from the
conditional Husimi function requires the assumption that
the signal light field is in some kind of Gaussian state.
Otherwise the deconvolution procedure will be more so-
phisticated and not necessarily unambiguous.
We also implicitly assume that the repetition rate of the
local oscillator is low enough to avoid memory attacks.
As is well known, a thermal light field may be described
as a random walk in phase space, where the instantaneous
light field at any time is given by a coherent state, which
dephases on a timescale given by the coherence time of
the light field. This means that two consecutive quadra-
ture measurements are not necessarily independent of
each other. For time delays shorter than the coherence
time of the light field, the measured values will still be
correlated, which will also provide side information. This
problem may always be avoided by choosing a delay be-
tween consecutive measurements that is long compared
to the coherence time of the light field. In our case, the
coherence time of the light field amounts to about 750 fs,
while the delay between local oscillator pulses amounts
to 13.3 ns, so the individual measurements can be con-
sidered as independent of each other.
While the present study corresponds to a proof of prin-
ciple demonstration, it would be very interesting for fu-
ture studies to repeat such an eavesdropping attack on
a QRNG that performs heterodyning on a thermal state
and investigate the expected guesswork for such a high-
performance device. Finally, we would like to empha-
size that from a spectroscopic point of view the central
figure of merit in our manuscript is the expected guess-
work and that it represents a quantity worth studying
in experiments. It is obvious that the expected guess-
work is of limited interest with respect to the security of
QRNGs as no reasonable protocol using private random
numbers would allow for a brute-force attack. However,
for example it is possible to map the problem of eaves-
dropping on a continuous variable QRNG to the problem
of performing time-resolved quantum state tomography
on a classical state of the light field in the absence of a
fixed phase reference between the LO and the signal. In
this problem, Eve’s measurement corresponds to an an-
cilla measurement used to guess the instantaneous phase
and amplitude of the signal light field, while Alice may
use this information to perform quantum state tomogra-
phy or conditional measurements of the signal at different
times relative to Eve. In this case, the expected guess-
work yields information that may be used to optimize the
state reconstruction process.
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Appendix A: Detector properties
In the main text, we presented the central figures of
merit for our detectors and outlined the calibration pro-
cedure. These can be derived from the frequency re-
sponse of the detector. One example comparing the re-
sponse at high LO powers and for no signal at all is shown
in figure 6.
A low-frequency shot-noise clearance of up to 15 dBm
may be reached. The results presented in the main text
were achieved using a smaller LO power of 5 mW. While
this results in a slightly reduced shot-noise clearance, it
also results in a larger dynamic range, which is bene-
ficial for thermal light, which shows a large variance of
quadrature values. Still, it is important to verify that the
detector is still operating in the shot-noise limit at this re-
duced LO power. We demonstrate this by measuring the
standard deviation of the vacuum state quadratures mea-
sured for several LO powers as shown in figure 7. Here,
the dots represent the experimental results, the constant
blue line denotes the basic electronic detector noise and
the red line represents the shot noise limit that scales as
the square root of the LO power. As can be seen clearly,
the detector starts to operate in the shot noise-limited
region for LO powers larger than approximately 1 mW.
Appendix B: Randomness extraction and statistical
tests
The focus of our manuscript is on the physical imple-
mentation of the attack instead of optimizing the perfor-
mance of a QRNG. Accordingly, we used only a strongly
simplified toy version of standard randomness extraction
procedures. We follow the procedure given in [40]. In-
stead of using Toeplitz matrices, we use simple random
matrices of size 32x16 containing 16 bit integers and a
fixed bit extraction rate of 4 bit per measurement. De-
tails on this procedure can be found in appendix B. In
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FIG. 6. Frequency response of the homodyne detector: The lowest detector output corresponds to the absence of any light
field at the detector. When applying a local oscillator with a power of 12.59 mW, the signal level rises and characteristic peaks
at the laser repetition frequency of 75.39 MHz and its multiples arise. These are removed by adding notch filters. In this
case, the low-frequency shot-noise clearance amounts to approximately 15 dBm and we reach a common-mode rejection ratio
of about 69 dBm.
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FIG. 7. Measured standard deviation of the unnormalized
vacuum state quadrature values for different LO powers. The
constant blue line and the red line denote the electronic de-
tector noise and the shot noise limit, respectively.
order to test our implementation of the quantum random
number generator, we also performed statistical tests on
the generated random numbers. We used the NIST suite
to test them [41]. All tests were passed as shown in ta-
ble I. Passing these tests does by no means certify that
the numbers are random, but demonstrates that several
types of patterns are absent.
Appendix C: Photon Number Ratios
Within the manuscript several different ratios between
nEve and nAlice have been investigated. For completeness,
table II below shows the exact photon numbers used in
the experiment.
Test name P-Value Result
Frequency 0.834 PASSED
BlockFrequency 0.067 PASSED
CumulativeSums 0.478 PASSED
Runs 0.689 PASSED
LongestRun 0.834 PASSED
Rank 0.637 PASSED
FFT 0.834 PASSED
NonOverlappingTemplate 0.421 PASSED
OverlappingTemplate 0.312 PASSED
Universal 0.789 PASSED
ApproximateEntropy 0.834 PASSED
RandomExcursions 0.477 PASSED
RandomExcursionsVariant 0.456 PASSED
Serial 0.739 PASSED
LinearComplexity 0.689 PASSED
TABLE I. Result of the NIST test suite applied to the ran-
dom numbers extracted from the continuous variable quan-
tum random number generator. Whenever there are several
tests in a category, the mean P-value is reported.
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